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Abstract—Online social media has become an important plat-
form to organize around different socio-cultural and political
topics. An extensive scholarship has discussed how people are
divided into echo-chamber-like groups. However, there is a lack
of work related to quantifying hostile communication or affective
polarization between two competing groups. This paper proposes
a systematic, network-based methodology for examining affective
polarization in online conversations. Further, we apply our frame-
work to 100 weeks of Twitter discourse about climate change. We
find that deniers of climate change (Disbelievers) are more hostile
towards people who believe (Believers) in the anthropogenic cause
of climate change than vice versa. Moreover, Disbelievers use
more words and hashtags related to natural disasters during
more hostile weeks as compared to Believers. These findings
bear implications for studying affective polarization in online
discourse, especially concerning the subject of climate change.
Lastly, we discuss our findings in the context of increasingly
important climate change communication research.
Index Terms—climate change, affective polarization, stance
detection, online social networks
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social networks represent a powerful space for public
discourse. Through large-scale, interconnected platforms like
social media, diverse communities may potentially participate
in open exchanges of views and information about a vast range
of issues. However, research has increasingly demonstrated
the dangers of polarization in online communication [1]–[3].
Attributed to various psychological, social, and technological
factors, intergroup communication on cyberspace has dis-
played tendencies to feature pathological dynamics especially
concerning contentious issues [4], [5].
Polarization on social media could be broadly divided into
different categories. Opposed groups may communicate in
a highly balkanized fashion, such that members of an in-
group are only minimally exposed to out-group members
and their beliefs [6], [7]. This phenomenon has been termed
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interactional polarization. Polarization can also pertain to
highly negative sentiments toward out-groups in the form
of affective polarization [8], [9]. Social scientific research
examines how these phenomena are interconnected across a
variety of contexts, such that online groups that disagree on
a given topic are also more likely to be hostile toward each
other [10]. In this paper, we focus on quantifying affective
polarization between two groups with opposing beliefs using
Twitter discourse on a significant social issue.
One significant issue which has received heated attention
in online public discourse is climate change [11]–[14]. We
focus on those who cognitively accept anthropogenic causes
of climate change (Believers) and those who reject the same
(Disbelievers). Previous work demonstrates not only sharp
divergences in climate change beliefs but also the emergence
of communities insulated from the opposed group [14]–[16].
In other words, online discussions about climate change are
interactionally polarized, implying the persistence of echo
chambers between Believers and Disbelievers [17]–[19].
Much less work, however, engages the question of affective
polarization in online climate change discourse. A crucial
limitation in prior work lies in the methodological options
available to past researchers. Relying consistently on manually
annotated corpora and datasets of limited size, existing schol-
arship has faced barriers to measuring the emotional compo-
nent of climate change discussions in a generalizable fashion
[8], [17], [18]. Drawing on recent advances in computational
stance detection, targeted sentiment analysis, and network
science measures, we present an integrated methodological
pipeline for addressing this gap in the literature.
More specifically, we show how computational methods
may be leveraged to generate (a) automated stance labels
for climate change Believers and Disbelievers, (b) individual
measurements of the interaction valence between in-group and
out-group members, and (c) broader assessments of group-
level affective polarization. We demonstrate the utility of
our framework by applying our methodology to a large-scale
dataset of 100 weeks of online climate change discussion on
Twitter. Furthermore, we link our findings to natural disasters
words to explain important climate change belief constructs.
In sum, this work proposes to answer the following research
questions:
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1) How can affective polarization be computationally mea-
sured on a large-scale, long-term corpus of online cli-
mate change discussions?
2) Do climate change Believers or Disbelievers feature
greater levels of affective polarization in online public
discourse?
3) What is the relationship of affective polarization between
the two groups with use of natural disaster related
words1?
The subsequent sections of this paper are organized as
follows. First, we provide an overview of related work in
this area, illustrating computational analysis of polarization
in general terms and then in the case of climate change
specifically. We zero in on the dearth of principled empirical
work on affective polarization specifically in relation to online
climate change discourse. Second, we present our proposed
methodological pipeline which integrates machine learning
models and network science techniques to facilitate a novel
and effective framework for assessing affective polarization.
Third, we share our findings on our large-scale, long-term
Twitter dataset. Last, we discuss implications for understand-
ing the state of climate change discourse on digital platforms
as well as related empirical investigation of affective polariza-
tion on online social networks.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Computational analysis of polarization
Recognizing the ubiquity of online conflicts, rigorous schol-
arship in the computational and social sciences has tackled
the problem of polarization. More traditional approaches in
offline settings have relied on survey measures to empirically
assess divergence in beliefs between groups [9], [20]. But
with burgeoning developments in computational methods -
especially with respect to natural language processing and
machine learning - automated methods have also arisen to
leverage the vast digital traces linked to online activity [21],
[22].
General approaches infer individual attitudes from user
information, such as the texts associated with an account
on social media (e.g., Facebook comments, tweets). Group
membership as well as group communication are similarly
incorporated into analyses of polarization, by examining the
beliefs of individuals in conjunction with their traceable
patterns of digital interaction with other individuals. Given
various conceptualizations of polarization, different frame-
works have been developed to quantify pathological patterns
of communication across groups holding similar or opposed
stances on a given issue [23]–[26].
Social network analysis has gained much methodological
traction in this regard. Representing online conversations as
graphical structures, numerous approaches measure polariza-
tion as a function of homophily in local community structures
[7], [27]. In other words, the extent to which those holding
1We provide the list of natural disaster related words used in our analysis
in §VI
similar views are more likely to interact with each other - in
contrast to those with whom they disagree - allows an intuitive
and principled measure of polarization. For example, random
walk scores quantify the probability of a random walk starting
from a node belonging to a given stance group ending up in
a node belonging to the same or a different stance group [2],
[28], [29].
More recent scholarship, however, emphasizes the impor-
tance of examining not just pathologically isolated commu-
nication, or interactional polarization; but also pathologically
hostile communication, or affective polarization. Burgeoning
evidence suggests that the problem of echo chambers repre-
sents a significant, yet incomplete, picture of polarization in
online social networks [1]. People holding opposed views, in
fact, do interact with each other - but this does not necessarily
mitigate polarization [6]. Instead, research finds that these
intergroup exposures trigger further incivility and toxicity [20].
Hence, reliable measures for affective polarization are needed,
although the computational literature in this area remains in
its nascent stages [10].
B. Climate change and polarization
In the specific case of climate change discourse, analysis
of polarization has also represented a major research topic.
Numerous studies link polarized beliefs about climate change
to partisan divides, with more conservative individuals less
likely to cognitively accept anthropogenic climate change than
liberals [11], [15]. Past work specifically demonstrates that
although higher levels of education and information access
may increase the likelihood of climate change belief, these
effects remain much lower among conservatives [13], [15].
Such effects have been explained from the lens of elite
signalling - whereby followers emulate the beliefs of their
preferred political leaders - uneven exposure to information
based on partisan media, as well as a generalized dislike for
the members of the opposed ideological group [30]–[32].
However, with time, scholars have also noted general trends
toward increasing climate change beliefs overall [16]. Even if
these do not necessarily translate into concrete support for
policy instruments to address climate issues [12], the long-
term instability of climate change skepticism points to valuable
ways forward for science communication [33]. Collectively,
these finding suggest the importance of accounting for the
psychological processes surrounding climate change belief and
disbelief, going beyond the transmission of information [34].
These issues take on specific forms in cyberspace, where
information flows are inextricably entangled with community
dynamics. Studies employing social network analysis have un-
covered robust evidence that online climate change discussions
tend to exhibit echo chamber-like homophilic interactions
[14], [19], [35]. Qualitative analysis further showed that in
rare instances of intergroup communication, more negative
frames tended to prevail, featuring dismissal of climate change
information as hoaxes, derailment of conversations to heated
issues of identity, as well as overall higher levels of sarcasm
and incivility [8], [17], [18]. Notwithstanding the valuable
idiographic insights derived from these studies, their sampling
strategies have tended to rely on a minuscule fraction of
the larger conversation to facilitate in-depth content analysis.
Hence, larger-scale and more generalizable findings on the
affective dynamics of online climate change discourse are
notably lacking in the literature.
C. Contributions of this work
Motivated by the foregoing insights, this work seeks to
contribute to the literature by offering a methodological
pipeline for examining affective polarization. As the succeed-
ing sections demonstrate, our framework combines machine
learning and network science methods in a novel, scalable, and
generalizable fashion for ready application in a variety of con-
tentious issues. This overcomes many of the methodological
barriers present in prior work, including their common reliance
on expensive survey or experimental measures, or manually
annotated datasets in the context of social media research on
climate change discourse [13], [15], [16], [19], [31].
From a theoretical standpoint, we additionally contribute
a nuanced operationalization of affective polarization as lo-
cated on a group level. We unpack how group-level metrics
valuably produce asymmetrical views of hostile behavior,
thereby facilitating more fine-grained analysis of how different
stance groups engage in varied levels of affectively polarized
interactions. This conceptually aligns with the asymmetry of
psychological factors characterizing climate change Believers
and Disbelievers, especially over time [11], [32], [33].
Finally, on an empirical level, our work also extends pre-
vailing scholarship on polarized climate change discourse.
While established findings paint a picture of consistent echo
chambers between climate change Believers and Disbeliev-
ers, we provide evidence for the flipside of these dynamics.
We specifically quantify, over a larger-scale and longer-term
dataset than previously examined in prior work, the extent to
which intergroup interactions systematically feature hostility.
This may inform possible data-driven interventions for poli-
cymaking beyond more prevalent frames of intergroup contact
and science communication [28], [34].
III. DATA AND METHODS
A. Data collection
We collected realtime tweets using Twitter’s standard API2
with keywords “Climate Change”, “#ActOnClimate”, “#Cli-
mateChange”. Our dataset was collected between August 26th,
2017 to September 14th, 2019. Due to server errors, the
collection was paused from April 7th, 2018 to May 21st, 2018,
and again from May 12th, 2019 to May 16th, 2019. We ignore
these periods from our analysis. We de-duplicated the collected
tweets to remove any duplicate tweets collected more than
once. Overall, we collected 38M unique tweets and retweets
from 7M unique users. For our analysis, we aggregate tweets
from each user for seven day period (1 week) to get a total of
100 weeks.
2https://developer.Twitter.com/en/docs/tweets/search/overview/standard
B. Stance labels
We use a state-of-the-art stance mining method [22] to
label each user as a climate change Disbeliever or Believer.
We use a weak supervision based machine learning model to
label the users in our dataset. The model uses a co-training
approach with label propagation and text-classification. The
model requires a set of seed hashtags essentially being used by
Believers and Disbelievers. The model then labels seed users
based on the hashtags used at the end of the tweet. Using
the seed users, the model trains a text classifier and uses a
combined user-retweet and user-hashtag network to propagate
labels. In an iterative process, the model then labels users who
are assigned a label by both methods with high confidence3.
We set ClimateChangeIsReal and SavetheEarth as Believers
seed hashtags and ClimateHoax and Qanon as Disbelievers
seed hashtags. These hashtags have been shown to be used
mostly by the respective groups [14]. Out of the total 7M
users, the algorithm labels 3.9M as Believers and 3.1M as
Disbelievers. We randomly sampled 500 users from each group
to manually validate the results. We label a user as Disbeliever
if we find any Tweet akin to someone who does not believe
in climate change or anthropogenic cause of climate change.
Otherwise, we label the user as Believer. We observe that
the average precision from manual validation of 1000 users
is 81.8%.
C. Affective polarization metrics
We measure affective polarization in this work by combin-
ing outputs from an aspect-level sentiment model, a classic
network science measure known as the E/I index [36] and
Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) [37]. Outputs are combined
in the five steps which follow to produce dynamic group-level
measurements of affective polarization.
1) Aspect-level sentiment: Aspect-level sentiment refers to
the emotional valence of a given utterance toward one of the
concepts it mentions [21]. Sentiments toward specific entities
are vital to consider in polarized discussions such as those we
consider here. For instance, climate change Disbelievers might
express negative feelings toward notions of greenhouse gases,
while in agreement with a fellow Disbelievers with whom they
are interacting.
We utilize Netmapper to extract entities from each tweet,
and predict the aspect-level sentiment of each tweet toward
each entity [38], [39]. Netmapper relies on a multilingual
lexicon of positively and negatively valenced words to cal-
culate sentiment values. Aspect-level sentiment relies on a
heuristic of a sliding window over words in the sentence. More
specifically, word-level sentiment is computed based on the
average of known valences for surrounding words.
For the purposes of this work, each tweet by a certain agent i
which mentions or replies to agent j is assigned an aspect-level
sentiment score from −1 (very negative) to +1 (very positive)
directed toward the concept “@[agent j’s Twitter handle]”
3 We use the parameter values as defined in [22] as {k = 5000, p = 5000,
θI = 0.1, θU = 0.0, θT = 0.7}.
[39]. This allowed us to compute affective dimensions to the
communication between groups of the same or opposed stance
groups.
2) Affective networks: Given the aspect-level sentiment
scores, we construct two affective networks representing the
climate change conversations on a per-week basis. Let G+ =
(V,E+) denote a positive interaction network where the set
of vertices V contains all Twitter accounts in our dataset and
the set of directed edges E+ contains all positive-valenced
mentions and replies between agents in V . Similarly, let
G− = (V,E−) denote a negative interaction network over
the same set of agents V and the set of directed edges E−
representing their negative-valenced mentions and replies.
In both cases, E+ and E− denote weighted edges. We
obtain their weights as follows. Let Sij denote the set of all
aspect-level sentiments in tweets by agent i toward agent j,
where i, j ∈ V . Then the weight w+ij of edge e+ij ∈ E+ from i
to j is given by
∑
x∈Sij min (0, x). Conversely, the weight w
−
ij
of edge e−ij ∈ E− from i to j is given by
∑
x∈Sij min (0,−x).
3) E/I indices: We assess group-level differences in pos-
itive and negative interactions using Krackhardt’s E/I index
[36]. For a given affective network, the E/I index intuitively
captures the extent to which each stance group k engages in
correspondingly valenced interactions with members of the
out-group relative to their in-group. Hence, for instance, high
values of the E/I index for the negative interaction network
would indicate that the given stance group interacts in a more
negative way to their opponents relative to those who share
their beliefs.
To compute the E/I indices, let Vk ⊆ V denote the set of
agents belonging to stance k and Vk′ those who do not hold
stance k. The E/I index of stance group k on the positive
interaction network is therefore computed as follows:
P+k =
E+k − I+k
E+k + I
+
k
(1)
where E+k =
∑
i∈Vk,j∈Vk′ w
+
ij and I
+
k =
∑
i,j∈Vk w
+
ij . On the
other hand, the E/I index of stance group k on the negative
interaction network is similarly computed thus:
P−k =
E−k − I−k
E−k + I
−
k
(2)
where E−k =
∑
i∈Vk,j∈Vk′ w
−
ij and I
−
k =
∑
i,j∈Vk w
−
ij . Given
the construction of P+k and P
−
k , we note that both values are
bounded between −1 and +1.
4) Polarization valence: We find whether the interactions
have negative valence or positive valence by defining polar-
ization Pk by taking a difference of the two E/I indices as
expressed below:
Pk = P
−
k − P+k . (3)
In this work, we operationalize our view of affective polar-
ization in terms of high E/I indices on the negative interaction
network, and low values on the positive interaction network.
Pk thus captures this intuition by assigning positive values
for groups that display disproportionately hostile or negative
interactions toward the out-group relative to their in-group.
Values close to 0, on the other hand, indicate relatively even
levels of positive and negative interactions for in-group and
out-group members. Finally, negative values indicate that those
holding stance k are more negative to their in-group but
positive to their out-group.
5) Polarization magnitude: To find the magnitude of affec-
tive polarization we use Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) on
the distribution of weighted edges for outgroup and ingroup
interactions. This is similar to computing first Wasserstein dis-
tance between two 1D distributions [40]. Similar to affective
networks, we define G = (V,E) as interaction network where
the set of vertices V contains all Twitter accounts in our dataset
and the set of directed edges E contains all valenced (positive
or negative) mentions and replies between agents in V . In this
case, we do not separate negative and positive valence graphs
and treat weight wij of edge eij ∈ E from i to j as given by∑
x∈Sij x. Let uk be distribution of wij , where i ∈ Vk, j ∈ Vk′
and let vk be distribution of wij , where i ∈ Vk, j ∈ Vk.
For a group holding stance k, we define our novel affective
polarization metric as:
lk =
{
− ∫ +∞−∞ |Uk − Vk| : Pk < 0∫ +∞
−∞ |Uk − Vk| : Pk ≥ 0
(4)
where Uk and Vk are the respective CDFs of uk and
vk. EMD is proportional to the minimum amount of work
required to covert one distribution to another 4. We use Pk
to assign positive or negative valence to the EMD. Although
there are other techniques to find the difference in distribution
such as KS-Test [41]. However, during our experiments, we
found that EMD is able to capture more nuanced differences
in distributions. More likely because the EMD can capture
differences in heavy-tailed distributions better and it does not
make any parametric assumptions [40].
Our novel affective polarization metric lk is positive when
Pk > 0. As noted in §III-C4, a positive value would mean
more hostility or negative sentiment in intergroup communi-
cation compared to intragroup communication. On the other
hand, a negative value of lk is when Pk < 0, meaning more
positive sentiment in intergroup communication compared to
intragroup communication.
IV. RESULTS
Using the metric defined in Equation 4, in this section,
we first explore how affective polarization between Believers
and Disbelievers is changing over the 100 weeks. Then we
explore how hostile periods are related to natural disaster-
related words.
We first look at how the affective polarization metric is
changing over time in figure 1. Overall, our analysis found
that climate change Disbelievers tended to exhibit high levels
4http://infolab.stanford.edu/pub/cstr/reports/cs/tr/99/1620/CS-TR-99-1620.
ch4.pdf
Fig. 1. Affective polarization metric (lk) for Believers and Disbelievers of climate change. Higher positive values denote more hostility towards the other
group. The dotted lines represent mean 1 standard deviation, which for Believers is -0.091 and 0.080 and disbelievers is -0.117 and 0.106. The analysis was
done on data collected from 26th August 2017 to 14th September 2019 as described in §III-A.
of hostility toward climate change Believers. This finding was
relatively consistent throughout the 100-week period under
observation, as the time series for climate change Disbelievers
only very rarely goes below the threshold of 0, which indicates
similarly valenced interactions toward in-group and out-group
members. Some weeks displayed exceptionally high levels of
hostility toward climate change Believers, greater than one
standard deviation from the mean. The standard deviation of
lk is lower for Disbelievers than for Believers. Indicating that
Disbelievers act in much more organized manner over the 100
weeks than Beleivers.
Climate change Believers, on the other hand, were not
generally hostile toward Disbelievers, as the time series for
climate change Believers tends to fluctuate over and under the
threshold of 0. This indicates that climate change Believers
communicate with in-group and out-group members with rel-
atively similar emotional valence. However, on certain weeks,
climate change Believers did also feature exceptionally high
hostility scores. This suggests that climate change Believers
may also behave in a hostile manner toward climate change
Disbelievers, even if not over the long term.
To investigate instances where hostility between Believers
and Disbelievers is high we compare those weeks with weeks
where hostility is low. We define hostile weeks as those data
points where lk is more than mean plus 1 standard deviation,
i.e. from figure 1, all the weeks where for Believers lk > 0.080
and for Disbelievers lk > 0.140. The number of such weeks
for Disbelievers where lk > 0.140 is 20 and for Believers
where lk > 0.080 is 12. We look further into these weeks as
examples of exceptional hostilie weeks.
Next, we use natural disaster-related words as a proxy
to determine how natural disasters play a role in hostility
Fig. 2. Percentage of the top 100 most frequent hashtags containing natural
disaster-related words. The figure shows the percentage when the affective
polarization metric is greater than 1 standard deviation or otherwise. The
error bars represent 1 standard errors.
between the two groups. In figure 2 we look at the top
100 most frequent hashtags used within those groups to find
the percentage of hashtags related to natural disasters. As
expected, Believers use more natural disaster-related hashtags
than Disbelievers. However, during the exceptional hostile
weeks Believers use less of these hashtags. Interestingly,
Disbelievers show the exact opposite behavior. Disbelievers
use more natural disaster-related hashtags when they are more
hostile towards Believers. We provide further evidence of this
finding in figure 3. In figure 3, we look at the percentage
of Tweets with at least one natural disaster-related word. We
find similar patterns as mentioned above. Moreover, we find
that a greater percentage of Tweets from Disbelievers mention
natural disaster-related words compared to Believers. This
indicates that Disbelievers are calling out natural disasters
more when they are exceptionally hostile towards Believers
compared to other weeks.
Fig. 3. Percentage of tweets with at least one natural disaster-related word.
The figure shows the percentage when the affective polarization metric is
greater than 1 standard deviation or otherwise. The error bars represent 1
standard errors.
V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Taken together, our findings suggest the importance of
considering affective polarization in online discourse, particu-
larly concerning the subject of climate change. Whereas past
studies had shed light on the echo chamber dynamics which
characterized intergroup communication surrounding climate
change [19], we show how this polarization extends also to
the realm of emotion in the form of affective polarization.
We extend existing studies which highlight the role of inci-
vility and personalized framing in encounters between climate
change Believers and Disbelievers [8], [18] by introducing a
scalable technique for analyzing relative intra- and intergroup
interaction valence. This allowed us to quantify the extent of
hostile communications between the two groups over a large-
scale, long-term dataset - thereby validating existing findings
in a generalizable manner as well as showing their relative
stability over time.
Furthermore, we highlight the value of viewing polarization
from an asymmetrical perspective. Related scholarship in
political psychology underscores how ideological asymmetries
underpin conflict dynamics across a variety of social issues
[42]. In other words, the participation of two groups within
polarized discourse does not necessarily mean that both groups
engage in conflict in the same way. Prior work illustrates that
these findings translate robustly to the digital sphere - political
elites or opinion leaders who share moralized content behave
in distinct ways depending on their ideological orientations
[4]. The present work contributes to the literature by showing
how these dynamics unfold the standpoint of the public at
large concerning online climate change discourse.
Indeed, higher levels of hostility from Disbelievers present a
specifically notable finding for social scientific scholarship on
climate change discourse. Longitudinal analysis in prior work
suggests that generalized climate change beliefs over time
are increasing [15], [16], and climate change Disbelievers in
particular are more susceptible to potential belief change [33].
But significant cognitive barriers remain for fuller acceptance
of anthropogenic causes for climate change and the corre-
sponding urgency for responsive policy changes [31], [43].
Higher levels of hostility among climate change Disbelievers
toward climate change Believers constitutes one such obstacle
for further dialogue between the two groups. As past stud-
ies suggest, one psychological factor which impedes climate
change Beliefs is not related to the climate at all, but anchors
primarily on the feelings of dislike felt by one group towards
the other [32]. Such challenges may thus persist in the form
of further entrenchment of Disbelievers within interactional
siloes and disengagement from intergroup communication
altogether [19]. Or as emergent studies show, they can also
trigger what have been called ‘trench warfare dynamics’ [6] -
whereby Disbelievers persistently communicate with Believers
but solidify their own cognitive immovability in the process.
These insights are especially important to consider given
our secondary set of findings. Our analysis suggests that
further asymmetries arise between Believers and Disbelievers
engagement with disaster words in relation to their levels of
affective polarization. Although comparable levels are seen
when both groups are within average levels of our metric,
moments of increased affective polarization correlate with
opposite behaviors for Believers and Disbelievers. Believers
appear to shift to other areas of contention, such that their
aggression is characterized by non-disaster topics. In contrast,
Disbelievers’ increased invocation of disaster terms points to
more aggressive discussion of these catastrophes, albeit posi-
tioned in resistance to explanations related to anthropogenic
climate change. This introduces another layer of intractable
conflict in beliefs, as major climate events do not appear to
invite susceptibility of belief change for Disbelievers. Instead,
they potentially incite more vigorous psychological resistance.
Collectively, these findings point to significant benefits
to studying affective polarization in online climate change
discourse. Although social media discourse does not neces-
sarily constitute a representative sample of a particular global
population [44], digital platforms like Twitter nonetheless con-
stitute a vital space for public conversations about important
issues like climate change. Hence, these findings paint a
useful picture of public discourse as situated specifically in
cyberspace, which may also bear implications for how digitally
mediated science communication and public policy may also
be designed and implemented [30], [34].
Besides the issue of demographic representativeness for
online data, other limitations attend the present analysis. First,
although we have a large number of tweets to characterize
general affective behavior, however, it does not encompass
those interactions which do not include our collection key-
words. Second, the task of getting an aspect-level sentiment
of each tweet towards other entities is a non-trivial task. We
use Netmapper which has been used with reasonable accuracy
for multiple sentiment level tasks [45], [46]. The focus of this
paper is on designing a framework to get affective polarization
score between two competing groups and we do not make
an effort to improve aspect-level sentiment scores. Last, in
our analysis we use a list of natural disaster related words.
Communication about the natural disasters could also happen
using specific names related to these disasters, for example
using “Dorian” instead of “Hurricane Dorian”. Such analysis
would require a more comprehensive list of natural disasters
occurring around the world during the 100 weeks. This is out
of scope for the current work.
Recognizing the foregoing limitations, we also consider
avenues for future work in this area. On a conceptual level,
researchers may wish to expand the binary system of climate
change beliefs assumed here. Affectively polarized dynamics
between multiple groups may be a more challenging yet
also potentially informative line of inquiry to explore given
the diversity of positions held with respect to this complex
issue. Methodologically, computational analysis may extend
our findings by performing more fine-grained characterization
of the types of hostility expressed by both groups. Natural
language processing (e.g., topic models) may offer one way
forward in this regard. Acknowledging the non-neutrality of
cyberspace, it would also be important to consider whether
disinformation maneuvers may also be involved in shaping
the wider climate change discussion. Inauthentic bot-like ac-
counts and trolls may unduly influence different groups by
manipulating the flow of information or amplifying intergroup
aggressions; such factors have been seen in relation to other
contentious issues and may potentially be present here as well
[47]–[49].
Finally, taking flight from the digital scope of our research,
further studies may fruitfully examine several hypotheses
opened up by our results. For instance, social scientists may
investigate actual levels of experienced hostility by climate
change Believers and Disbelievers toward opposed groups.
These evidence bases would be valuable to accumulate in
cross-cultural settings, as well as over time - especially in
connection with concurrent political shifts and natural climate-
related developments like anomalous weather patterns and
wider-ranging disasters [15], [16], [31].
REFERENCES
[1] P. Barbera´, J. T. Jost, J. Nagler, J. A. Tucker, and R. Bonneau, “Tweeting
from left to right: Is online political communication more than an echo
chamber?” Psychological science, vol. 26, no. 10, pp. 1531–1542, 2015.
[2] K. Garimella, G. De Francisci Morales, A. Gionis, and M. Mathioudakis,
“Political discourse on social media: Echo chambers, gatekeepers, and
the price of bipartisanship,” in Proceedings of the 2018 World Wide Web
Conference, 2018, pp. 913–922.
[3] A. Tyagi, A. Field, P. Lathwal, Y. Tsvetkov, and K. M. Carley, “A
computational analysis of polarization on indian and pakistani social
media,” in Social Informatics. Springer, 2020.
[4] W. J. Brady, J. A. Wills, J. T. Jost, J. A. Tucker, and J. J. Van Bavel,
“Emotion shapes the diffusion of moralized content in social networks,”
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 114, no. 28, pp.
7313–7318, 2017.
[5] D. Geschke, J. Lorenz, and P. Holtz, “The triple-filter bubble: Using
agent-based modelling to test a meta-theoretical framework for the
emergence of filter bubbles and echo chambers,” British Journal of
Social Psychology, vol. 58, no. 1, pp. 129–149, 2019.
[6] R. Karlsen, K. Steen-Johnsen, D. Wollebæk, and B. Enjolras, “Echo
chamber and trench warfare dynamics in online debates,” European
Journal of Communication, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 257–273, 2017.
[7] A. Matakos, E. Terzi, and P. Tsaparas, “Measuring and moderating
opinion polarization in social networks,” Data Mining and Knowledge
Discovery, vol. 31, no. 5, pp. 1480–1505, 2017.
[8] A. A. Anderson and H. E. Huntington, “Social media, science, and attack
discourse: How twitter discussions of climate change use sarcasm and
incivility,” Science Communication, vol. 39, no. 5, pp. 598–620, 2017.
[9] J. N. Druckman and M. S. Levendusky, “What do we measure when
we measure affective polarization?” Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 83,
no. 1, pp. 114–122, 2019.
[10] M. Yarchi, C. Baden, and N. Kligler-Vilenchik, “Political polarization
on the digital sphere: A cross-platform, over-time analysis of interac-
tional, positional, and affective polarization on social media,” Political
Communication, pp. 1–42, 2020.
[11] R. E. Dunlap, A. M. McCright, and J. H. Yarosh, “The political divide
on climate change: Partisan polarization widens in the us,” Environment:
Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, vol. 58, no. 5, pp. 4–
23, 2016.
[12] D. R. Fisher, J. Waggle, and P. Leifeld, “Where does political polar-
ization come from? locating polarization within the us climate change
debate,” American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 70–92, 2013.
[13] A. M. McCright and R. E. Dunlap, “The politicization of climate change
and polarization in the american public’s views of global warming,
2001–2010,” The Sociological Quarterly, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 155–194,
2011.
[14] A. Tyagi, M. Babcock, K. M. Carley, and D. C. Sicker, “Polarizing
tweets on climate change,” in To appear International Conference SBP-
BRiMS, A. H. Halil Bisgin, C. Dancy, , and R. Thomson, Eds. Springer,
2020.
[15] L. C. Hamilton, J. Hartter, M. Lemcke-Stampone, D. W. Moore, and
T. G. Safford, “Tracking public beliefs about anthropogenic climate
change,” PloS one, vol. 10, no. 9, p. e0138208, 2015.
[16] T. L. Milfont, M. S. Wilson, and C. G. Sibley, “The publics belief in
climate change and its human cause are increasing over time,” PloS one,
vol. 12, no. 3, p. e0174246, 2017.
[17] S. M. Jang and P. S. Hart, “Polarized frames on climate change and
global warming across countries and states: Evidence from twitter big
data,” Global Environmental Change, vol. 32, pp. 11–17, 2015.
[18] C. W. van Eck, B. C. Mulder, and A. Dewulf, “Online climate change
polarization: Interactional framing analysis of climate change blog
comments,” Science Communication, p. 1075547020942228, 2020.
[19] H. T. Williams, J. R. McMurray, T. Kurz, and F. H. Lambert, “Network
analysis reveals open forums and echo chambers in social media
discussions of climate change,” Global environmental change, vol. 32,
pp. 126–138, 2015.
[20] A. Banks, E. Calvo, D. Karol, and S. Telhami, “# polarizedfeeds:
Three experiments on polarization, framing, and social media,” The
International Journal of Press/Politics, p. 1940161220940964, 2020.
[21] B. Huang, Y. Ou, and K. M. Carley, “Aspect level sentiment classifi-
cation with attention-over-attention neural networks,” in International
Conference on Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural Modeling and
Prediction and Behavior Representation in Modeling and Simulation.
Springer, 2018, pp. 197–206.
[22] S. Kumar, “Social media analytics for stance mining a multi-modal
approach with weak supervision,” Ph.D. dissertation, Carnegie Mellon
University, 2020.
[23] K. Darwish, “Quantifying polarization on twitter: The kavanaugh nom-
ination,” in International Conference on Social Informatics. Springer,
2019, pp. 188–201.
[24] D. Demszky, N. Garg, R. Voigt, J. Zou, J. Shapiro, M. Gentzkow,
and D. Jurafsky, “Analyzing polarization in social media: Method
and application to tweets on 21 mass shootings,” in Proc. of
NAACL. Minneapolis, Minnesota: Association for Computational
Linguistics, Jun. 2019, pp. 2970–3005. [Online]. Available: https:
//www.aclweb.org/anthology/N19-1304
[25] A. Morales, J. Borondo, J. C. Losada, and R. M. Benito, “Measuring
political polarization: Twitter shows the two sides of venezuela,” Chaos:
An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, vol. 25, no. 3, p.
033114, 2015.
[26] I. Weber, V. R. K. Garimella, and A. Batayneh, “Secular vs. islamist
polarization in egypt on twitter,” in Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE/ACM
International Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis
and Mining, ser. ASONAM 13. New York, NY, USA: Association
for Computing Machinery, 2013, p. 290297. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1145/2492517.2492557
[27] L. G. Stewart, A. Arif, and K. Starbird, “Examining trolls and polar-
ization with a retweet network,” in Proc. ACM WSDM, workshop on
misinformation and misbehavior mining on the web, 2018.
[28] K. Garimella, G. De Francisci Morales, A. Gionis, and M. Mathioudakis,
“Reducing controversy by connecting opposing views,” in Proceedings
of the Tenth ACM International Conference on Web Search and Data
Mining, 2017, pp. 81–90.
[29] K. Garimella, G. D. F. Morales, A. Gionis, and M. Mathioudakis,
“Quantifying controversy on social media,” ACM Transactions on Social
Computing, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1–27, 2018.
[30] T. Bolsen and M. A. Shapiro, “The us news media, polarization on cli-
mate change, and pathways to effective communication,” Environmental
Communication, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 149–163, 2018.
[31] J. T. Carmichael and R. J. Brulle, “Elite cues, media coverage, and public
concern: an integrated path analysis of public opinion on climate change,
2001–2013,” Environmental Politics, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 232–252, 2017.
[32] L. Van Boven, P. J. Ehret, and D. K. Sherman, “Psychological barriers
to bipartisan public support for climate policy,” Perspectives on Psycho-
logical Science, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 492–507, 2018.
[33] H. C. Jenkins-Smith, J. T. Ripberger, C. L. Silva, D. E. Carlson,
K. Gupta, N. Carlson, A. Ter-Mkrtchyan, and R. E. Dunlap, “Partisan
asymmetry in temporal stability of climate change beliefs,” Nature
Climate Change, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 322–328, 2020.
[34] D. M. Kahan, H. Jenkins-Smith, T. Tarantola, C. L. Silva, and D. Bra-
man, “Geoengineering and climate change polarization: testing a two-
channel model of science communication,” The ANNALS of the Ameri-
can Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 658, no. 1, pp. 192–
222, 2015.
[35] E. F. Bloomfield and D. Tillery, “The circulation of climate change
denial online: Rhetorical and networking strategies on facebook,” Envi-
ronmental Communication, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 23–34, 2019.
[36] D. Krackhardt and R. N. Stern, “Informal networks and organizational
crises: An experimental simulation,” Social psychology quarterly, pp.
123–140, 1988.
[37] F. L. Hitchcock, “The distribution of a product from several sources to
numerous localities,” Journal of mathematics and physics, vol. 20, no.
1-4, pp. 224–230, 1941.
[38] L. R. Carley, J. Reminga, and K. M. Carley, “Ora & netmapper,”
in International Conference on Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural
Modeling and Prediction and Behavior Representation in Modeling and
Simulation. Springer, 2018.
[39] J. Uyheng, T. Magelinski, R. Villa-Cox, C. Sowa, and K. M. Carley,
“Interoperable pipelines for social cyber-security: assessing twitter in-
formation operations during nato trident juncture 2018,” Computational
and Mathematical Organization Theory, pp. 1–19, 2019.
[40] A. Ramdas, N. G. Trillos, and M. Cuturi, “On wasserstein two-sample
testing and related families of nonparametric tests,” Entropy, vol. 19,
no. 2, p. 47, 2017.
[41] F. J. Massey Jr, “The kolmogorov-smirnov test for goodness of fit,”
Journal of the American statistical Association, vol. 46, no. 253, pp.
68–78, 1951.
[42] J. T. Jost, “Ideological asymmetries and the essence of political psy-
chology,” Political psychology, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 167–208, 2017.
[43] M. T. Ballew, A. R. Pearson, M. H. Goldberg, S. A. Rosenthal, and
A. Leiserowitz, “Does socioeconomic status moderate the political
divide on climate change? the roles of education, income, and indi-
vidualism,” Global Environmental Change, vol. 60, p. 102024, 2020.
[44] F. Morstatter, J. Pfeffer, H. Liu, and K. M. Carley, “Is the sample
good enough? comparing data from twitter’s streaming api with twitter’s
firehose,” in 7th International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social
Media, ICWSM 2013. AAAI press, 2013, pp. 400–408.
[45] K. M. Carley and D. M. Beskow, “Trident joust 2017, after action
report,” Center for the Computational Analysis of Social and Organiza-
tional Systems, 2017.
[46] D. Cardoso Llach and J. Argota Sa´nchez-Vaquerizo, “An ecology of
conflicts,” in Computer-Aided Architectural Design. “Hello, Culture”,
J.-H. Lee, Ed. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2019, pp. 198–212.
[47] K. M. Carley, G. Cervone, N. Agarwal, and H. Liu, “Social cyber-
security,” in International Conference on Social Computing, Behavioral-
Cultural Modeling and Prediction and Behavior Representation in
Modeling and Simulation. Springer, 2018, pp. 389–394.
[48] D. A. Broniatowski, A. M. Jamison, S. Qi, L. AlKulaib, T. Chen, A. Ben-
ton, S. C. Quinn, and M. Dredze, “Weaponized health communication:
Twitter bots and russian trolls amplify the vaccine debate,” American
journal of public health, vol. 108, no. 10, pp. 1378–1384, 2018.
[49] A. Bessi and E. Ferrara, “Social bots distort the 2016 us presidential
election online discussion,” First Monday, vol. 21, no. 11-7, 2016.
VI. APPENDIX
List of natural disaster related words used in the analysis:
avalanche, blizzard, bushfire, cataclysm, cloud, cumulonimbus, cy-
clone, disaster, drought, duststorm, earthquake, erosion, fire, flood,
forestfire, gale, gust, hail, hailstorm, heatwave, high-pressure, hurri-
cane, lava, lightning, low-pressure, magma, naturaldisasters, nimbus,
permafrost, rainstorm, sandstorm, seismic, snowstorm, storm, thun-
derstorm, tornado, tremor, tsunami, twister, violentstorm, volcano,
whirlpool whirlwind, windstorm
